Introduction
There are two basic principles governing unemployment compensation: the insurance principle and the welfare principle cf. Schmid, Reissert 1996 . The main objective of an unemployment compensation system based on the insurance principle is income smoothing, i.e. the compensation for lost earnings and the provision of some form of status maintenance. In contrast, unemployment compensation guided by the welfare principle focuses more on income redistribution or the alleviation of poverty b y providing a minimum income. In an insurance system bene ts are linked to previous earnings and sometimes also to the duration of previous employment. In the literature such a system is known as the Bismarckian model of unemployment insurance cf. Ploug, Kvist 1996 . On the other hand, a system emphasizing the welfare aspect is usually based on at-rate bene ts, as suggested by Beveridge see the Beveridge Report 1942.
In most OECD countries a t wo-tier unemployment compensation system is implemented which takes account of both principles. In an initial period of unemployment, unemployment bene ts which are related to previous earnings are usually paid. If the spell of unemployment lasts longer or if eligibility criteria for unemployment bene ts are not met, unemployment assistance bene ts are paid, which are usually independent of previous earnings and contribution payments. 1 In many aspects, the unemployment compensation system in the UK corresponds most closely to the Beveridgean system, since both unemployment bene ts and unemployment assistance are implemented as at-rate payments. In contrast, the Bismarckian system is most closely realized in Germany, since both unemployment bene ts and unemployment assistance are earnings-related. 2 In this paper we compare the consequences of labor market shocks with respect to real wages and unemployment for economies with either an earnings-related or at-rate unemployment compensation system. The shocks we consider are changes in the relative bargaining power of labor unions, the generosity of unemployment bene ts or labor unions' 1 preferences. A distinctive feature of our analysis is the comparison of both unemployment compensation systems in a two-country setting. It is demonstrated that the performance of the Beveridgean and Bismarckian systems crucially depends on whether the labor market shock is provoked in the home country or originates from abroad. We also point out how our results extend to two-tier unemployment compensation systems which di er with respect to the relative importance of earnings-related and at-rate bene ts.
Only recently attention has been paid to the dependence of results and policy conclusions on the institutional setup of the unemployment compensation system. 3 For example, Schluter 1997 , by adopting a search-theoretic general equilibrium framework, scrutinizes the relative performance of earnings-related and at-rate bene ts with respect to the alleviation of poverty and the reduction in income inequality. Goerke 2000 , Goerke, Madsen 2000 and Heer, Morgenstern 2000 analyze the employment and real wage e ects which result when a country increases the share of earnings-related unemployment bene ts relative to at-rate transfers. Br uninger 2001 establishes a link between the type of unemployment compensation system and the employment performance of di erent skill groups. Cremer and Pestieau 1998, focusing on payroll tax competition, develop a political economy approach where the type of unemployment compensation Beveridgean or Bismarckian is chosen behind the veil of ignorance. All these models only deal with the closed economy. As far as we know, up until now no comparisons of both unemployment compensation systems in multi-country models have been performed in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the theoretical framework of a two-country model with imperfectly competitive labor and product markets. As a useful benchmark case, in section 3 we rst compare the performance of the Beveridgean and Bismarckian unemployment compensation systems in the closed economy, which can be interpreted as a special case of the two-country model. Section 4 then presents the comparative-static analysis for the two-country case. A comparison of the results and the discussion of some model extensions is found in section 5. Our concluding remarks appear in section 6.
The theoretical framework
The performance of economies with di erent unemployment compensation systems is compared within a two-country model with imperfect competition on goods and labor markets. The goodsmarket is integrated and characterized by monopolistic competition between rms each producing a distinct variety of a tradable product. On the labor market wage bargaining takes place at the rm level. The outcome of the wage-setting process is in uenced by the relative bargaining power of rms and unions, the preferences of labor unions for employment and wages and the institutional setup of the social security system. It is assumed that countries di er with respect to these variables but otherwise are identical. The di erences in wage setting may lead to country-speci c wage and price levels since it is assumed that migration of the labor force is impeded by cultural and linguistic barriers. Besides the number of households, the number of rms in both countries is also exogenously given, which may bedue to barriers to market entry provoked by sunk costs. For most part of the paper, the model is closed by assuming that unemployment bene ts are nanced by lump-sum taxes on the xed stock of capital. In this case the comparative-static analysis is facilitated by the fact that the government budget constraint and the impact of taxes on the wage-setting process have not to betaken into account. In appendix A.1 it is demonstrated that the same qualitative results are, in principle, obtained if unemployment bene ts are nanced by a proportional tax on wage income. Hence, the assumption of a lump-sum tax on capital simpli es the exposition, but is not decisive for our results. It should also benoted that the model is intended to bea description of the longer run, where expectations are correct and nominal rigidities play no role. Our results are therefore not caused by short-run frictions. 
; 1 1: 1 Y h ij denotes the quantity of good i produced in country j = A; B which is purchased by the representative consumer located in country h = A; B. The speci c form of the utility function implies a constant elasticity of substitution between all goods, equal to . Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor which is supplied inelastically. Since migration is excluded, labor can only be supplied in the respective home country. The representative consumer of country h faces the budget constraint in real terms
2 where p ij are the relative prices of the various goods in terms of the aggregate good which serves as num raire. Since the focus of the paper is not on di erences in the tax system, value added taxes and customs duties are neglected in the model. This implies that the price for a speci c goodis the same for consumers and producers of either country. In eq. 2 it is assumed that rms in each country are owned by domestic residents, hence In equilibrium all rms in one country are facing the same country-speci c wage rate.
Furthermore, rms share the same technology. Hence p ij = p j and Y j = F = 2 Y ij , which leads to the following inverse demand function for country j: 
Demand for labor in every country
Producers act as monopolistic competitors, taking account of the product demand function 4 when choosing labor demand. The behavior of rms is governed by the fact that there is a large number in every country, which implies that rms are small compared to the national economy as a whole. As a result, the single rm does not consider the consequences of its actions for the aggregate variables and for other rms.
Firms use the Cobb-Douglas technology Y ij = N ij K 1, ij , where N ij is employment and K ij is the exogenously given capital stock of rm i in country j = A; B. Each rm chooses the employment level which equalizes marginal revenue and the real wage w ij in terms of the aggregate good. This leads to the labor demand functions N ij , i = 1 ; : : : ; F = 2 and j = A; B. Since all rms are identical and face the same country-speci c wage rate w j to bedetermined later, it follows that the national levels of employment and capital stock are given by N j = F = 2N ij and K j = F = 2K ij , respectively. Hence, demand for labor in every country is determined by As a result, changes in employment i n one country will a ect labor demand in the other country via the impact on world real income. Writing eq. 6 as an inverse labor-demand 
Wage setting in every country
In every country wage bargaining takes place at the rm level. The utility function V ij of labor union i in country j is assumed to be given by V ij = N j ij w ij , z j ; j 0; 8i; j; 9 where j represents labor unions' preferences for employment relative to wages in country j. The variable z j denotes expected real income of a worker in country j, who loses his job in the rm under consideration.
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As the bargaining parties are small units compared to the whole national economy, z j is exogenous for the single rm or union. It was already pointed out that unemployment bene ts are nanced by taxes levied on the xed stock of capital, whereas the discussion of a model variant with a proportional tax on wage income is delegated to appendix A.1. Since in the following payroll taxes and taxes on wage income are neglected, the real wage w ij is the same for employers and employees.
It is obtained from maximizing the Nash product with zero fall-back positions for unions and rms, V j ij 1, j ij , where 0 j 1. The parameter j denotes the bargaining power of a representative union in country j and ij the real pro ts of the respective rm.
After some rearrangement, the rst-order condition for this optimization problem can be written as According to eq. 10 the bargained real wage at the rm level is a mark-up on the expected alternative income z j . In order to get a permissible solution for w ij , i t m ust hold that j 1. To derive the wage-setting equation for country j, the expected alternative income z j must be de ned more precisely. Since migration is excluded, z j depends solely on variables speci c to country j:
, 1 , j u j w j + j u j s j ; 0 j 1; j u j 0; 11 where w j is the average wage level and s j is the real unemployment compensation in country j both in terms of the aggregate good. With probability j an employee loosing his job at rm i will become unemployed and with probability 1 , j he will nd a job elsewhere in the economy. The respective probabilities depend on the unemployment rate u j .
6
Systems with earnings-related or at-rate unemployment bene ts are special cases o f a t wo-tier unemployment compensation system, which can bede ned as: s j = s j w j ; j ; j ; b j = j j w j + 1 , j b j 0 j 1; 0 j 1; b j 0: 12
In this equation j denotes the percentage of unemployed who receive earnings-related unemployment bene ts, j is the replacement ratio and b j denotes at-rate unemployment 6 From an intertemporal framework it follows that the probability j also depends on the discount rate and the quit rate see, for instance, Beissinger and Egger 2000. Country-speci c di erences with respect to these variables lead to di erent functions j . The function j may also re ect di erences in matching technologies between countries. 7 bene ts in real terms. 7 For j = 1 a pure earnings-related unemployment compensation system is obtained, whereas j = 0 implies that all bene ts are paid as at-rate transfers. Since within a country all rms and unions are identical, w ij = w j must hold in equilibrium. Using the de nitions of z j in the rm-level wage equation 10, one gets w j , j j j j , 1 s j w j ; j ; j ; b j = 0 :
13 Inserting eq. 12 in this equation, the national wage-setting equation is given by w j j j ; j j u j 1 , j j , 1 j j ; j j u j , 1 , j b j = 0 :
14 In order to guarantee that w j 0 it must be assumed that j j 1 , j j , 1 0, which also implies that j j , 1 0.
Earnings-related unemployment compensation system: If j = 1 , it can be seen from eq. 14 that the wage-setting equation alone already determines the level of unemployment. As a result, the wage-setting curve in real wage-unemployment space is vertical at the unemployment rate u j = u j j ; j ; j , which is given by 1 , j j j ; j j u j j ; j ; j , 1 0 The sign of w j b j follows from the fact that j j , 1 0 must hold, as stated above. Since w j u j 0, the wage-setting curve has a negative slope in real wage-unemployment space.
Aggregate output and its impact on labor demand
From eq. 6 it is obvious that labor demand in every country depends on aggregate output, which itself is an endogenous variable. Since national prices p j in terms of the aggregate good may di er, aggregate output has to be written as
Taking account of the inverse demand functions 5, the production functions at the 18 According to eq. 17 aggregate output is a negative function of both unemployment rates. This has to be taken into account in the inverse labor demand equations of both countries, hence eq. 7 is written as w j = n j u j ; y u A ; u B n j u j 0; n j Y 0; y u j 0; j = A; B: To determine the sign of the terms in brackets, it has to be noted that with 1 it holds that 1 , 1 , . Since 2 ,1 1 and Y j =Y 1, it follows unambiguously that n j u j + n j Y y u j 0. This means that the labor demand curves of both countries are sloping upwards in real wage-unemployment space.
As a crucial feature of the model, labor demand of every country also depends on the unemployment rate of the other country via its impact on aggregate output. Since n j Y y u i 0 for i 6 = j, i; j = A; B , the labor demand curve shifts downward if unemployment i n t h e neighboring country increases.
3 Labor-market shocks in the closed economy In other words, there is no room for aggregate output playing an autonomous role besides employment in the labor demand equation. This is in contrast to the two-country framework, where aggregate output depends on employment i n b o t h countries and labor demand is therefore in uenced by employment or unemployment of the other country as well.
For the comparative-static analysis we focus on the special cases of the pure Bismarckian or Beveridgean unemployment compensation system. In the case of earnings-related bene ts ERB the unemployment rate is determined by the closed-economy version of eq. 15. The real wage is then derived from eq. 21. On the other hand, with atrate bene ts FRB the wage-setting equation corresponds to the closed-economy v ersion of eq. 16. Unemployment and real wages are then simultaneously determined by the interplay of this wage-setting equation and the inverse labor-demand function 21.
As an example, we n o w consider the consequences of an increase in labor union power , which can be summarized as These results are illustrated in gure 1. In the earnings-related unemployment compensation system the wage-setting WS curve is vertical, whereas in the case of at-rate bene ts the WS curve is falling. The labor demand LD curve is identical in both cases.
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The initial equilibrium is given by the unemployment rate u 0 and the real wage w 0 point A. A rise in labor union power leads to the same outward shift of the WS curves in both cases. As can be seen from gure 1, the resulting change in unemployment and real wages is greater with earnings-related bene ts point B E than with at-rate bene ts point B F . The intuition behind this di erence is that in an earnings-related unemployment compensation system the expected alternative income z will increase more than in The consequences of an adverse labor market shock in the closed economy dependent on the type of unemployment compensation system a at-rate system because bene ts are a function of the rising real wage. This leads cet. par. to higher wage pressure on the rm level.
It can be concluded that in the closed economy the variability of unemployment and real wages in response to labor market shocks is greater with earnings-related than with atrate bene ts. This implies that in the face of adverse labor market shocks the employment performance of the Bismarckian unemployment compensation system is less favorable than that of the Beveridgean system. However, if labor market reforms are undertaken, which are aimed at reducing unemployment for instance by reducing labor union power, the resulting decline in unemployment i s cet. par. stronger with earnings-related bene ts.
the labor demand of one country is in uenced by the unemployment rate of the other country via its impact on aggregate output. The analysis of the domestic consequences of a labor market shock in country A must therefore take account of the reaction to this shock in country B. This in turn is in uenced by the unemployment compensation system prevailing in country B. Hence, depending on the type of unemployment bene ts in each country, four model variants can be distinguished. The analysis also enables us to answer the question of how the unemployment compensation system in uences spillover e ects of labor market shocks originating from abroad. To do so, we only have to emphasize the results for country B in the following analysis.
In all model variants the two-country equilibrium can be described by the following system of four equations consisting of two inverse labor-demand functions a and two wagesetting equations either b1 or b2.
a Labor demand The system contains the endogenous variables w j and u j j = A; B. We focus on the consequences of an adverse labor market shock in country A which, for example, is caused by an increase in labor union power, A . However, one should bear in mind that the qualitative results derived below also apply to the case where labor union's preferences for employment, A , decline or the generosity of unemployment bene ts A or b A is increased. Of course, with the following analysis conclusions about positive labor market shocks are also possible. Such shocks might be caused by labor market reforms in country A which, for instance, lead to reduced labor union power or lower unemployment bene ts in that country.
13
Case I: Earnings-related bene ts in both countries. In gure 2 the consequences of an adverse labor market shock in country A are depicted. Earnings-related unemployment bene ts imply vertical wage-setting curves in both countries. Rising wage pressure in country A shifts the respective WS curve to the right, leading to higher unemployment and higher real wages in this country. Due to the rise in unemployment aggregate output declines, thereby shifting the labor demand curve of country B downwards. As a result, the employees in country B experience a real wage decline, but employment remains unchanged. Figure 3 illustrates the results. Due to the adverse labor market shock the WS curve of country A moves to the right, leading to a new equilibrium at point B. The increase in unemployment in country A shifts the labor demand curve of the other country downwards. With a vertical wage-setting curve in country B only the real wage level but not employment is adversely a ected by the shock originating from abroad. Comparing cases I and II, it can be analytically shown that in country A the increase in unemployment and real wages is greater with earnings-related bene ts ERB than with at-rate bene ts FRB. The computations are analogous to the discussion for the closed economy. The conclusion is also evident from a comparison of gures 2 and 3 if it is taken into account that in both cases the WS curves are horizontally shifting by the same amount: evident. The adverse labor market shock in country A shifts the WS curve to the right, implying higher real wages and unemployment in that country. However, the accompanying downward shift of the labor demand curve in country B not only implies lower real wages but also higher unemployment, since with at-rate bene ts the WS curve is downward sloping. The increase in unemployment in country B reinforces the decline in aggregate output, provoking a repercussion e ect which shifts the labor demand curve of country A downwards. The nal equilibrium in both countries is represented by point C . The results can be easily compared with the respective gure for case I, where in both countries earnings-related bene ts are paid. It is evident that in both model variants country A experiences the same increase in unemployment. However, with at-rate benets in country B the further decline in aggregate output dampens the real wage increase in country A. In country B an earnings-related unemployment compensation system partly neutralizes adverse labor market shocks originating from abroad, since only real wages but not employment are a ected.
Case IV: Flat-rate bene ts in both countries. In this case unemployment rates and real wages of both countries are determined simultaneously. By equating eqs. 16 and 19 the system can be reduced to a two-equation system, which determines unemployment in both countries. The e ects of a rise in labor union power in country A can then be It is then easy to see that with respect to unemployment the ranking is unambiguous for both countries see A complete ranking of real wage outcomes would, for instance, bepossible if dw A j I I I dw A j I I . Analogous to the above discussion it can be shown that a su cient condition for this is that the inequality sign in eq. 25 is reversed. However, if condition 25 holds, it is possible that dw A j I I I dw A j I I . In this case an additional comparison of dw A j I I I and dw A j I V would be necessary.
Up until now we only considered pure earnings-related or at-rate unemployment compensation systems. However, most European countries have a two-tier system where an unemployed person either receives earnings-related or at-rate unemployment bene ts depending on the duration of unemployment, eligibility criteria and so on. The Bismarckian and Beveridgean systems analyzed above can also be interpreted as useful benchmark cases from which the following results can bederived for a two-tier unemployment compensation system. It has been demonstrated that an earnings-related system leads to greater employment e ects than a at-rate system in the country where the labor market shock originates, whereas the reverse is true for the other country which is a ected by the shock spillover. The graphical analysis made clear that the slope of the wage-setting curve is of central relevance for this result. Since earnings-related bene ts are usually at least as high as at-rate bene ts in two-tier unemployment compensation systems, it follows from the discussion in appendix A.2 that a country with a two-tier system has cet. par. a steeper wage-setting curve than a country with a at-rate system, but the WS curve will not be vertical as with earnings-related bene ts. Since a two-tier unemployment compensation system lies somewhere in between the Bismarckian and Beveridgean system, the employment e ects of shocks also lie in between the e ects derived above. As a consequence, the employment e ect of a labor market shock will be weaker than it would be under a Bismarckian Beveridgean system for country A B. On the other hand, it will be stronger than the employment e ect that arises if country A B has a at-rate earningsrelated unemployment compensation system. These results can be generalized, since the slope of the wage-setting curve depends on the percentage j of unemployed receiving earnings-related bene ts. A higher j means that the two-tier system comes closer to a Bismarckian system. In appendix A.2 it is shown that the WS curve will become steeper if j increases. Hence, with rising j the employment e ect for country A B will become greater smaller.
As a nal remark we would like to point out that we have checked the robustness of our results by modifying some of the model's assumptions. In Beissinger, Buesse 2000 a model variant is considered where the production technology is described by a CES instead of a Cobb-Douglas function. 10 It turns out that in this case the wage-setting curve in combination with earnings-related bene ts is no longer vertical but downward sloping. that higher unemployment also leads to higher income taxes, which cet. par. generates higher wage pressure. If the wage-setting curve is downward sloping, our results also remain valid in the case where bene ts are nanced by a tax on wage income.
Summary and conclusions
In this paper we discuss the consequences of labor market shocks for economies with either a Bismarckian i.e. earnings-related or Beveridgean i.e. at-rate unemployment compensation system. For the analysis a two-country model with imperfect competition on goodsand labor markets is developed. On the goodsmarket monopolistic competition prevails, and the labor market outcome is in uenced by wage bargains taking place between rms and labor unions. While the goods market is integrated, labor markets are separated since it is assumed that international mobility o f labor is hindered by cultural and linguistic barriers. The labor market shocks considered are changes in the relative bargaining power of labor unions, the generosity of unemployment bene ts or labor unions' preferences.
As a benchmark case the consequences of labor market shocks in the closed economy are examined rst. This is a special variant o f t h e model where both countries are united to a single economy with the same labor market institutions. It is shown that labor market shocks lead to a stronger change in unemployment if the unemployment compensation system is earnings-related. For the country where the shock occurs a similar result is obtained in the two-country framework, in which repercussion e ects from the neighboring country have additionally to be taken into account. The two-country analysis also makes clear how the unemployment compensation system in uences spillover e ects of labor market shocks originating from abroad. It is shown that an earnings-related unemployment compensation system partly neutralizes such shocks, since only real wages but not employment are a ected. In contrast, with at-rate unemployment bene ts both unemployment and real wages are in uenced by labor market shocks stemming from abroad.
Our results suggest that in the discussion about reforms of the unemployment compensation system the susceptibility to labor market shocks should also betaken into account.
Suppose, for instance, that the government wants to implement an unemployment compensation system which minimizes employment uctuations. The choice then depends on whether labor market shocks are expected to occur in the home country more frequently than abroad. If labor market shocks usually have their origin in the domestic economy, a at-rate unemployment compensation system is more suitable to dampen employment uctuations. However, if the economy is hit by labor market shocks stemming from abroad, an earnings-related unemployment compensation system should bechosen.
The assessment of both systems changes if the government expects that mainly positive labor market shocks occur in the future. For instance, if it is planned to reduce unemployment by labor market reforms, the employment gains would be stronger under an earnings-related unemployment compensation system. Other countries could pro t from the reforms in the neighboring country in terms of employment if bene ts were paid as at-rate transfers.
